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An extract from a paper read by a Polish philosopher 
at the Congress of the International Sociological Asso­
ciation held in France, September 1966.
PROBLEMS of the philosophy of man, and particularly the 
question of the relationship between the individual and society, 
become historically important whenever the stabilized social order 
begins to waver and when, together with it, the socially accepted 
system of values loses its stability. As long as the social machinery 
functions without frictions, as long as— in a marxist phrase—  
there is harmony between the forces and the relations of pro­
duction, the individual, formed as he is by these social relations, 
tends to regard them as natural; and in the same way he accepts 
the prevailing norms of social intercourse by which his relation­
ships with society are regulated. This is a very simple process 
and in most cases it takes place unconsciously since people, 
through their upbringing within a society and a social group, 
receive from society their language, a certain mode of viewing 
the world and of thinking and a system of values with its habits, 
customs and morals. It is only the collapse of the social order, 
the rise of objective conflicts within the base, and, consequently, 
in the superstructure, the upsetting and disintegration of a 
traditionally accepted system of values that makes the individual 
start considering his identity and asking about his relationships 
With other individuals, with society.
What makes a decent life? T his is a question which, in various 
°rms, has always faced human beings. But at times of revolution  
°r of transition from one socio-economic system to another, when 
^here is a breakdown in the traditional relations between the 
Individual and society and the arduous formation of new ones, 
his question asserts itself with particular force. People become 
‘‘cutely aware that they are no longer able or willing to live in 
he old way, without yet knowing how they should live. Such 
Periods encourage the individual to reflect on his status and his 
'Jestiny; and they stimulate the development of a philosophy of 
*&an. Historically, these have been the periods of an ‘explosion’
this kind of inquiry, when the Socratic current, for which 
j .an is the primary object of philosophy, has driven out the 
ernocritean trend, a philosophy of nature for which the over-
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riding task is to investigate and formulate the general laws 
governing reality.
T hat historical conflicts play an important role in the conflicts 
of human consciousness— and this turns men’s minds inwards— 
was clearly seen in the past, and is seen also today, by those 
thinkers to whom man and his problems are the main subject 
of inquiry. T he doctrine of an unhappy, torn consciousness was 
the work of Hegel; today, in quite different conditions, his 
thoughts are approvingly repeated by Jean Hyppolite:
B ut critical periods in  history are those in which the old o rder is 
already no  m ore th an  semblance, and the new one has no t yet emerged. These 
periods of transition  which precede revolution are also periods of spiritual 
dilem m a. T h e  dialectic reaches the  m in d  only as a negative dialectic. Its 
positive side, which is the opposite of the  negative, has yet to be perceived. 
Since the  tim e of Hegel a ttention  has been repeatedly drawn to the  crises 
preceding the  great changes in  the  field of accepted values. B ut Hegel's 
analysis seems to us particu larly  original for its time.*
More than a century ago, in  1845—when Marx was working 
on his first writings— Soren Kierkegaard observed in his diary that
fieriods preceding great changes see the appearance of men who, ike certain birds which announce the coming of rain, are capable 
of predicting the imminent social storm.* According to Hans 
Schoeps this can apply to many thinkers of that period (and, let 
me add, certainly to Marx), who, long before their contemporaries, 
correctly foresaw the crisis of the age and the breakdown of the 
existing system of values. These sentiments were surely expressed 
most forcefully and with an admirable clarity by a contemporary 
observer of events, Alexis de Tocqueville:
I t  is obvious to me th a t those who for sixty years have been predicting 
the end of the revolution, are in  error. I t  is q u ite  clear today th a t the waves 
are still rising, and the  last dams are th rea tened  by the sea; th a t no t only 
have we no t seen the  end of th a t pow erful revolution which began before 
We were born  b u t i t  is also p robable th a t a child  today receiving his first 
glim pse of the ligh t of the day will no t see i t  e ither. W hat is involved is no 
-longer a  change, bu t a  complete transform ation  of the  social system. Where 
is th e  world heading? Frankly, I  do no t know and I th ink  th a t this is b e y o n d  
the m inds of all of us. W e only know th a t th e  old world is draw ing to an 
end. W h at will the  new world be like? Even the  greatest m inds of ou r tixne 
are unab le  to tell, ju st as the  m inds of the ancients could not foresee the  end 
of slavery, th e  advent of the  Christian world, the invasion of the  barbarian* 
and all those things which have changed the  face of the  globe.*
These words—written by Tocqueville to a friend in 1850— 
vividly convey the state of m ind of those people who were then 
concerned with the question of the individual and his r e la t io n ­
ship with a rapidly changing society. And their name was legio^
* Jean  H yppolite, E tudes sur M arx  et Hegel. L ib. M arcel Riviere, Paris 1955’ 
pp. 60-1.
* Soren K ierkegaard, Tagebucher, ed. T h . Haecker, 1, p. 326. Q uoted after 
H ans Schoeps, W as ist der M ensch?  M usterschm idt Verlag, G ottingen 1960, p . 2O’
* A. de Tocqueville, (Euvres, T om e V, Paris 1866, p. 461-2 (L etter to  Eugene 
Stoffels, of 28 A pril, 1850.)
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It was precisely this problem, under the comprehensive name 
of humanism, which was the dominant note in the circles in which 
Karl Marx moved and which in a sense fashioned his attitudes. 
Feuerbach, Moses Hess, Bruno Bauer, Max Stirner and many 
others, including the young Marx, are all preoccupied with  
this question which they regard as of the utmost importance: 
how can man who has been turned into a slave of his alienated 
products be made the independent creator of his destiny? how  
to ensure a full and unrestricted development of his personality? 
how to create the most favorable conditions of human happiness 
and to transform human existence into something in keeping 
with the ideal of man, with his ‘essence’ (or, in the language of 
those days, to transform the real man into the true man)?
On closer inspection the problems then tackled by the propon­
ents of humanistic tendencies prove to be still extremely relevant. 
Here is man faced by an alienated world in which his products 
—in the field of economy, politics, ideology (particularly religion) 
and social life (particularly the family)— are acquiring a certain 
independence; they no longer submit to the individual’s power 
and will, but, on the contrary, begin to dominate and subjugate 
him. Like the devil's disciple, man has unleashed forces which 
he is unable to control. Hence the need to transform this inhuman 
world, in which things are masters of men, into a human world—  
a world of free human beings who are architects of their destiny 
and to whom man is the supreme good. A humanism of this kind 
is a theory of happiness. T he prime objective is to make people 
haPPy. to make them capable of happiness.
In taking up these problems Marx was in no way breaking 
new ground: nor was he isolated in his endeavors. On the con- 
rary, in Lenin’s fine phrase, he was following the broad highway 
the issues and thoughts of his age. This was one of the reasons 
or his greatness and one of the sources of his relevance today; 
in exP̂ a*ns why he seems so close to us when we ask these questions 
our own conditions. For while the problems studied by the 
young Marx and his contemporaries had a wider historical validity, 
aching far back into the past, it was then that they made them- 
* *  particularly felt. It was obvious to everybody— and the 
of the French Revolution were a painful reminder—  
stji, lbe old world was drawing to an end. T he new world was 
in Kmergent’ revealiRS ancl aggravating the basic contradictions 
the process. The old system of values had collapsed and the 
w system was in a formative stage, asserting itself amid a host 
H - n f l i a ,  T he problem of the individual— lost and craving 
to r  ^  oppressed and pining for freedom, exploited and longing  
sha1V? a  ̂ life, rent and thirsting for happiness—stood out more 
(ju/P.y than ever in clear and vivid relief. It became the salient 
stion of an age of change and revolution.
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And it is this which makes these issues touch so sensitive 
a chord today, in a situation which is different but similar, in an 
age of incomparably sharper conflicts and contradictions which 
are, however, analogous to the old ones.
Marx and his contemporaries— Kierkegaard among them— 
asked questions about human existence and advanced various 
humanist programs because this existence was clearly threatened 
and because society obviously demanded answers to certain prob­
lems. Hegel wrote that no philosophy can go beyond the limits 
of its age— an idea which can also be phrased differently; each 
philosophy, and certainly philosophy which is not without response, 
provides answers to some topical questions and problems. This is 
why problems of the individual are also tackled by us today in a 
variety of philosophical guises and why the young Marx’s work 
seems so much in tune with our own reflections.
T he domination of anthropological themes in m odem  philo­
sophy arises out of the demand for answers concerning human 
existence at a time when this existence is in danger and when, 
at the watershed between two formations, the traditional system 
of values has been undermined. On this point there is a consensus 
of opinion among all students of the subject who are otherwise 
very far apart, if not diametrically opposed, in their philosophical 
convictions.
Here is the view of a communist, Roger Garaudy:
T h e  two world wars have had  a decisive influence on the  form ation and devel­
opm ent of the  philosophy of existence. Above all, i t  was largely due  to  them 
th a t all philosophies—atheist existentialism ; C hristian philosophy, m arxism -' 
h ad  to become philosophies of existence because the  foundations of human 
existence h ad  been questioned and the  answer could no longer be delayed' 
T h ere  is no m odern, living philosophy w hich does not reflect th is situation of 
m an, the situation  of all m en, enm eshed as they are in  general conflicts and 
unknow n destinies, facing a continuous th rea t of death, experiencing a fear 
generalised on the  scale of the events which engender it.*
And at the other pole of philosophy we find Martin Buber 
who, in my view, has provided one of the most interesting analyse5 
of the subject— all the more interesting as it was formulated before 
the outbreak of the second world war, and thus before its conse- 
quences for man’s situation in the world today were known. I11 
Le probleme de I'homme* Buber speaks of ebbs and flows i” 
anthropological thought which depend on man’s sense of isolation  
If an explanation were added of the source of this isolation an^ 
the reason why man feels ‘without hearth or hom e’ in a rapidly 
changing world in which human relations and their underlyi11#
♦Roger G araudy, Perspective de I’hom m e. Presses Univ. de France, Paris 1959' 
p . 8.
•M artin  Buber, L e  problem e de I’hom m e, A ubier, Paris 1962, p . 19.
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systems of values are subject to revolutionary changes, one could 
fully agree with this diagnosis.
But it is only in our times, says Buber, that the anthropolo­
gical problem has fully matured. He thinks that— apart from the 
evolution and crystallization of philosophical thought in general—  
this is due to two factors.
First comes the sociological factor: the disintegration of the 
traditional forms of human society, such as the family, the rural 
and urban community, etc., which are a result of the bourgeois 
revolution.
Secondly—and this is in my view the most interesting part of 
his argument—man has lost control over the world he has himself 
created— the phenomenon which Marx once called, after Hegel, 
alienation.
This concerns the relationship  between m an and the objects and relations 
which arose out of his activity o r w ith his participation . Man lets himself 
be overtaken by his own works—here  is exactly how I w ould describe this 
particular feature of the m odern crisis. M an is no longer in a position to take 
in the world created by his own activity; this world is getting  the u p p e r hand 
of him, slipping ou t of his hands, opposing him  in all its elem entary indepen­
dence, and man no longer knows the magic word which could cast a spell 
over the man-m ade Golem and m ake him  harmless.*
His wording may be different, but Buber is referring to the 
same developments that preoccupied the young Marx and his con­
temporaries when they analysed the status of the individual in 
relation to the great upheavals of their age. And he is discussing 
the same things when speaking of technology, economics and 
politics as the main domains in which the ascendancy of man- 
made things and relations over man is revealed.
In Buber’s analysis the problem is placed in particularly sharp 
^ehef in the case of politics— in the light of the experiences of 
World War I. Naturally, his words take no account of the appal- 
jng experience of the second world war and its aftermath, or of 
e at°m ic sword of Damocles now hanging over mankind.
ljfê  so m an found himself confronted w ith a sinister fact: he  was giving 
0£ tj^.° demons which he could not then subjugate. W hat was the m eaning 
to ls P °" 'cr which was a t the  same tim e powerless? T h e  problem  was reduced 
practfcal11̂ 81*0-'̂  a*3° u t tbe  n a tu re  ° f  m an, which was acquiring a new, suprem ely
And this is surely where the essence of the problem lies: in 
in r i Philosophical anthropology has acquired a practical mean- 
It explains why such inquiries exploded after the first world
♦ On B“ ber- °P- Cit., p. 60.
P- « t-, p. 61.
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war, and even more after the second—an interesting socio-psycho- 
logical phenomenon emphasised by both Buber and Garaudy. In 
the twenties Martin Heidegger summed up the position in these 
pointed words:
In  no  age before has so m uch knowledge about m an been accumulated 
and never has i t  been so diversified. B ut in no age before have we known 
less abou t m an. In no period before has man been the  object of so many 
questions as in our tim e.*1
Symptoms of alienation have long been present in society— 
probably ever since the inception of social life— but never have 
they been so drastic and powerful as they are today in all possible 
forms: economic, political, social, and ideological. Human exist­
ence has always been, throughout history, subject to various 
dangers, but never before has this threat acquired such tremen­
dous dimensions and never has it been fraught with such terrifying 
consequences for the existence of mankind as today.
And, naturally, in the past, too, systems of values have been 
rocked. But never before has this been so universal and far- 
reaching as today when in one part of the world the conviction 
is growing that the old systems of values, though publicly vener­
ated, have outlived themselves and are no longer of use, while in 
the other part men are harassed by a situation in which new 
systems have not yet been consolidated and thus are not yet as 
useful as they should be.
Small wonder then that the individual feels threatened, in­
secure, frightened, that he does not feel organically united with 
society and, consequently, feels lonely and isolated. These are 
normal things at a time of change and of a weakening of human 
relations. But it is also normal that in such periods man tends 
to wonder about himself and to ponder questions which are other­
wise hardly noticed; it is at such times that the role and importance 
of philosophical anthropology grows considerably. In Buber’s fir>e 
words:
In  th e  history of the  hum an  sp irit I  d istinguish ages when m an has * 
hom e and those in which he is homeless. In  the form er he inhab its the  world 
like a  house, in  the  la tter h e  lives in the world as in  an open field, sometiffl6* 
even w ithout the  four pegs necessary to  p u t  up  a tent. In the  form er anthro­
pological though t is only p a rt of cosmological thinking, in  th e  la tte r it becomeS 
profound , and thus independent.*
It is precisely at such a historical juncture—when men live 
society not as in a house but as in an open field— that our w orld  
has found itself today; particularly since the second world war 
and the beginning of the atomic age.
♦M artin  Heidegger, K ant u n d  das Problem  der M etaphysik, Verlag Fr. Cohen, 
Bonn 1929, p. 200.
•O p. cit., p . 19.
